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Introduction: Twenty-first century Europe1
 In 1976 Eric Stein and Gregg Vinning wrote that the nature of the (then) European 
Economic Community  (EEC) was “at the borderline between the federal and the international”, due 
to the expansive constitutional integration led up by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and to its governance structure and decision-making processes which resembled more of a 
common international organization2. In fact, as the classic doctrine of European Union (EU) law 
has discussed, the process of establishing the European political project was a constitutional 
struggle between the judicial and the political, with the former taking up  the lead from the 
latter3.The paradigm started to change in the end of the eighties. Since the Treaty of Maastricht that 
the political process has picked up the wheel of integration and directed the constitutional evolution 
of the project at an unprecedented speed. For example, there were three treaties signed between 
1992 and 2013 (Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon). The EU adopted a single currency, the euro, which 
is nowadays used by eighteen Member States. Also, the EU more than doubled its members since 
Maastricht, being now composed of twenty-eight countries. These events prove how fast did the 
Union change during the past twenty years. It is is true that this constitutional momentum had some 
backlash, most notably  with the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in the beginning of the new 
century. But even this project was rescued and re-cast as the Treaty of Lisbon, in 2007. Political 
support for the project has been steadily renovated by  heads of state, and enlargement processes 
continue. 
 It is even difficult to predict when will this evolution stop. The current financial crisis has 
showed many deficiencies of the project, and the necessity for closer integration. There have been 
talks of a banking union and stricter financial supervision. Discussions concerning new forms of 
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political governance have also emerged consistently over the last two years, in order to strengthen 
certain deficiencies of the project4.
 Another point which represents this steep evolution, and one which clearly marks a shift to 
the federal side, is the new human rights paradigm of the Union. The fundamental rights policy 
created by the CJEU since the Stauder case has also been constitutionalized. The EU has now an 
extensive and ambitious catalogue of rights protected in its Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Moreover, another important step has been taken with the eminent accession of the Union to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This process, discussed for many  years, received 
an impressive political support with Lisbon and the constitutionalization of the duty to accede. 
Discussions are still underway, with some problems awaiting to be solved, but it seems that the 
process will have a positive ending. The Union will then be another member of the Convention, 
another contracting “State”, an event which fuels hopes for an even greater scrutiny  of its 
institutions in face of individuals.
 In sum, this has been the originality of the European project, to transform itself into a hybrid 
political form that, although resembling an international organization, has powers that  go well 
beyond just that. However, it  is also its main focus of frustration, since albeit  being fairly  integrated, 
it still shows several structural deficiencies. Some of these deficiencies are fundamental — the lack 
of a financial governance structure prepared to deal with deficit imbalances inside the federal 
system is the first to come to mind, nowadays — and risk to undermine in the long run the 
successes already achieved. One of these problems is the limited standing granted to individuals 
when challenging EU acts in front of the EU’s courts. The restrictive approach laid down by  the 
CJEU in 1965 in Plaumann, concerning the interpretation of the criteria of individual concern 
remains practically  still valid nowadays. This is a quarrel that has existed since the beginning stages 
of the EU’s history  and has never been fully solved, much to the annoyance of private plaintiffs and 
academic commentators who believe there is a denial of access to justice being perpetuated. 
 Some authors like Francis Jacobs, former Advocate General (AG) of the CJEU and one of 
the most devoted critics of the ECJ’s long-standing interpretation of locus standi provisions, 
believes that accession to the ECHR will be an opportunity to solve this problem5. This is a 
legitimate belief. In fact, by being for the first time under the judicial control of an external entity, 
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there will be more pressure in the EU to comply with fundamental rights. The ECtHR could very 
well find a violation of right of access to court in the EU. However, there have been no studies 
considering this chance, and to concretely assess what could be the impact of accession in solving 
this problem specifically. Although it is true that the Convention protects the right of access to 
justice, it also accepts certain restrictions on its adjudication by contracting states. More so, before 
the period of accession, the ECtHR had already the opportunity  to express its opinion regarding the 
judicial system of the EU. These issues show that the proponents of a more-relaxed locus standi 
rules in the EU will still face several hurdles when discussing their claim in Strasbourg. The 
purpose of this thesis is, by looking at  the history of relations between the ECHR and the EU and of 
both the right of access to court in the case-law of the ECtHR and to the locus standi problem in the 
case-law of the ECJ, to see how this issue could be solved if a claim arrived to the ECtHR after 
accession.
 This work is divided in five parts. In the first one we will look at the relationship between 
the ECHR and the EU, and see how the Convention became an integral part of the EU’s legal 
system, first through the case-law and then by the Treaties. We will also see how the ECtHR has 
dealt with problems concerning the EU and the Convention in its case-law. In the second part we 
will look at the accession process, its impact and the difficulties arising from it. In the third part we 
will look at how the ECtHR has protected the right of access to court. We will see how the 
Strasbourg court has stated the emanation of the right from article 6(1) of the Convention and how 
it has interpreted its magnitude. We will see that, like most rights of the Convention, the right of 
access to court is not an absolute one and allows for certain limitations, albeit inside certain limits. 
In the fourth part of this work we will shift to the EU and look at the locus standi problem, both into 
its historical progress and to its critical perspective. Finally, in the fifth and final part, we will look 
at how the restrictive  approach to locus standi rules could be discussed in front of the ECtHR. We 
will base ourselves in the findings of the second and third parts of the thesis to elaborate certain 
points of discussion and their possibility of success. We will finish by giving our assessment on the 
impact of accession to locus standi in the EU: is it  really a time for change, or just a false 
opportunity?
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 1. The ECHR and the EU
 1.1 The relationship of the EU to the ECHR: from Hauer to the Charter
 The ECHR was adopted in 1950, as a symbol of a common commitment of European 
countries to protect fundamental rights6. It was signed five years after the end of the Second World 
War, in a time where several mechanisms that exalted a universal, humanitarian kantian-like project 
of individual protection at  a global level — like the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, 
approved at the United Nations in 1948 — were also created. It appeared seven years before the 
EEC. Jean Paul Jacqué wrote that “the problem of relations between the ECHR and European 
Integration is almost as old as integration itself”7. In fact, there were discussions in the “travaux 
preparatoires” of the ad hoc assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community  concerning the 
possible insertion of provisions of the Convention in what would be the Treaty of Rome8. These 
discussions were fruitless in the end, since the Treaty did not  make one single mention to 
fundamental rights or the ECHR in its text.
 However, it was only a matter of time before these two legal projects would interact, thanks 
to the action of the CJEU. The Luxembourg Court was faced with a series of cases in the sixties, 
starting with Stauder, that put the question of whether the EEC had a fundamental rights policy9. 
Since there was no mention of fundamental rights protection in the Treaty of Rome, the Court had 
to create this notion and justify where it came from. It first stated, in the Nold case, that the 
protection of fundamental rights in the EU emanated from “constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States”10. Then, in Hauer, the Court added to these traditions the principles of the 
Convention, stating that “international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which 
should be followed within the framework of Community law” like the “European Convention for 
7
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New York: Oxford University Press, 2010
7  Jean Paul Jacqué, "The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms" Common Market Law Review, 48, 2011, pp. 995
8  Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community in http://aei.pitt.edu/991/1/
political_union_draft_treaty_1.pdf, pp. 24 and 25; Jean Paul Jacqué, id, pp. 995.
9 Gráinne De Búrca and Paul Craig EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Fourth Edition) New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011, pp. 364; Damian Chalmers,  Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 233
10  Case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen-und Baustoffgroßhandlung v.  Commission of the European Communities, [1974] ECR 
491
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950”11. It  made sense 
that if the Court was to insert its action in a common humanitarian “space”, it would need to refer to 
the most important symbol of the European commitment to fundamental rights, the “minimum” 
protection level accepted12. 
 From that moment on, the ECHR became part of the legal order of the EEC. This was a 
move that has been strengthen over the years in decisions like Pupino or Elgafaji13. This situation, 
however, was problematic and controversial, since there was no way  for the ECtHR to control the 
action of the Union or the CJEU when applying the Convention. The Luxembourg Court, in fact, 
made an interesting move: it inserted the Convention as a source of fundamental rights of EU law, 
but put under its umbrella the control of its application in the EU. As Jacqué writes, “the de facto 
substantive incorporation had the effect of giving the Court the last word on the Convention within 
the scope of Community  law”14. It  was the best of two worlds for the CJEU, since it maintained its 
autonomy but solved possible complications with Member States regarding the role of the 
Convention in the EU. According to Bruno de Witte, this allowed for the CJEU to make “an eclectic 
and unsystematic approach” to the Convention that would better serve its interests15.  
 Approval of article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) signed in 1992 in 
Maastricht was an important step in the understanding of the ECHR in the EU. According to this 
provision, the Union had now to respect fundamental rights “as guaranteed by the European 
Convention of Human Rights”16. For the first time ever, there was a political document of 
constitutional level that stated the need for the Union to act with respect towards the Convention. 
However, this did not change the primacy  of interpretation of the Convention by the CJEU in the 
Union’s sphere. One thing is to have the duty — even if constitutional — to respect the ECHR. 
Another thing is to be subject to the interpretative control of the Strasbourg Court. What article 6 
TEU did was just to politically formalize the criterium settled by the ECJ in Hauer. The Union still 
had the power to define the final interpretation of the Convention in its sphere, since the Court 
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judging this prerogative was the CJEU. Still, it was an important  political move to declare that the 
EU had to respect, as a whole, the rights set out in the Convention. 
 Another step with regards to the role of the ECHR in the EU happened with the approval of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, in the Treaty of Nice. There are two norms of this 
document that concern how the Convention impacts the interpretation and adjudication of rights 
established in the Charter. The first article is paragraph three of article 52, which states that the 
scope of the rights established in the Charter will have the same “meaning and scope” as the 
correspondent rights established in the ECHR. The second norm is article 53, which adds to the 
former that “[n]othing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of application” by the 
ECHR. Both these norms express the important status of the Convention as the basic paradigm for 
correspondent fundamental rights proclaimed in the Charter. This has been evidenced in cases such 
as Melloni or Fransson, where for example the CJEU stated that  “as Article 6(3) TEU confirms, 
fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute general principles of the European Union’s 
law and whilst Article 52(3) of the Charter requires rights contained in the Charter which 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR to be given the same meaning and scope as those laid 
down by the ECHR”17. 
 These political movements confirmed the existing case-law of the CJEU in the matter, and 
did not alter the formal status quo between both systems. However, it is clear that the Convention is 
part of the EU legal order. 
 1.2 The relationship of the ECHR to the EU: under the hand of Bosphorus
 It was not only  the EU that had to react to the existence of the Convention in its same space 
of intervention, nor was the CJEU the only court that had to decide on controversies regarding the 
concrete relationships between these two systems. The ECtHR also had to deal with the impact of 
EU law in the legal space of its contracting states. Some EU measures had direct effect in the 
national sphere, such as regulations and decisions. Others, like directives, had an indirect effect 
since they  needed to be transposed to the national sphere. This was a complex situation, since 
national laws — and by this we mean laws approved by national parliaments through national 
constitutional processes — were approved following a legal obligation to comply with general 
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commands of European nature, thus shading doubts about who was, in fact, the “true” legislator. 
Although the general aspects of the law were laid down by European institutions, the concrete 
measure was created by national legislators. The other problem concerned the application of the 
law. Through the idea of direct effect and supremacy established by the ECJ in the “holy trinity” of 
Costa Enel, Van Gen den Loos and Simmenthal, European law is applied by national authorities as 
if it was national law. However, the law is not national, but European or “federal”. The problem 
then arises when an individual challenges an action by a national authority that regards an 
infringement of his / her convention rights due to the application of EU law. Since the EU is not a 
formal member to the Convention, there is a dangerous “grey” area with respect to the control of 
EU law which is applied by Member States. On one hand, Member States can argue that it is not 
“their law” since they it  was not their parliament who made it. On the other hand, the EU can argue 
that since it  has no formal obligations to the Convention, it can not be held responsible in 
Strasbourg for violating it. 
 The ECtHR took two steps in this regard, which can be seen as answers to the ECJ take on 
the Convention18. The first  step happened in Matthews19. In this case, the ECtHR had to deal with 
the voting rights of citizens of Gibraltar for the European Parliament, which were not granted by the 
UK, the country which holds political control of the island. The Court considered in that matter that 
an EU act could not be challenged for violating the Convention rules since the EU was not a party 
to the ECHR. However, “[t]he Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to 
international organizations provided that Convention rights continue to be ‘secured’. Member 
States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer.”20 With this statement, the Court 
opened the door for the possibility of controlling the powers which were transferred for the EU. 
However, it did not develop it further, considering that the prohibition stated by the UK to citizens 
of Gibraltar to vote on the elections for the European Parliament violated their right to vote21.
 The second step, and arguably  the most prominent case concerning the relationship of the 
EU with the ECHR, was Bosphorus22. In this case, the ECtHR had to deal with the application of an 
EC Regulation concerning the seizure of an airplane which was originally from former Yugoslavia, 
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19 ECtHR, 18 February 1999, Case of Matthews v. United Kingdom, application no. 24833/94
20 Id, paragraph 32. 
21 Id, paragraph 65
22 ECtHR, 30 June 2005, Case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, application no. 
45036/98
in Ireland. The Strasbourg Court argued, as it had done before in Matthews, that States could 
transfer competences to international organizations. However, these transfers could not serve as a 
way to obliterate their duties with regards to the Convention. “[T]he Court has recognized that 
absolving Contracting States completely from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered 
by such a transfer would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention; the 
guarantees of the Convention could be limited or excluded at will, thereby depriving it of its 
peremptory character and undermining the practical and effective nature of its safeguards”23. In 
order to prevent this, the ECtHR created the concept of equivalent protection. According to the 
ECtHR, the transfer of powers from a contracting state to a transnational entity can only  be valid if 
this entity offers a similar level of protection of fundamental rights to that of the Convention24. 
Following this notion, the ECtHR did an analysis of European integration history and its 
progressive commitment to human rights protection25. It then decided that the EU fulfilled the 
equivalent level of protection. “[T]he Court finds that the protection of fundamental rights by 
Community law can be considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, “equivalent” (...) to 
that of the Convention system. Consequently, the presumption arises that Ireland did not depart 
from the requirements of the Convention when it implemented legal obligations flowing from its 
membership of the European Community”26  and therefore the decision of the Irish authorities did 
not infringe the Convention.
 The ECtHR made two important moves with this decision. In the first one, by developing 
the argument of Matthews and stating that it could judge the action of international organizations 
acting through a transfer of powers by the Member States, the Court delivered an answer to the 
ECJ’s take on the Convention. It was as if the ECtHR was saying to the ECJ that “if you can use the 
Convention, that I can also judge EU law when Member States act under its rule”. The second move 
served as a cold shower on the first. By  creating the idea of equivalent protection, the ECtHR was 
judging in fact the level of protection of the EU’s fundamental rights policy. Although the final The 
decision of considering the level of protection offered by the EU of equivalent level to the one in 
Strasbourg softened the impact of the first move it meant, basically, that Strasbourg could control 
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Rights After the Lisbon Treaty: from Bosphorus sovereign immunity to full scrutiny?”, 13 January 2008, http://
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25 Case of Bosphorus, id, paragraph 159
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Brussels and, maybe, even Luxembourg, if it considered that the presumption was not valid 
anymore.
 Other cases two cases granted two more opinions on the relationship between the ECHR and 
the EU. In the Emesa Sugar case an applicant wished to prove that the impossibility of responding 
to the opinion of the AG in a case submitted to the EU courts amounted to a violation of fair trial 
rights under article 6(1) of the ECHR. There was the question of whether the ECtHR would find the 
action inadmissible ratione personae since the EU was not a formal member to the Convention. The 
Court did not find it necessary to discuss the matter, since it considered that the applicant’s claim 
did not fall under the category of “civil rights and obligations” established in article 6(1), since it 
was a tax dispute27. However, in the subsequent Kokkelvisserij U.A which addressed the same 
problem (the possibility  to answer to the opinion of the AG) the Court went further and considered 
the admissibility of challenging an act of the CJEU. Since the preliminary ruling had been asked by 
a domestic Dutch court, the ECtHR considered that it existed an international legal obligation that 
the State had to comply with, and applied the Bosphorus test of equivalent protection. The Court 
then decided that there were sufficient procedural guarantees for the applicants to use, since they 
could ask for a reopening of the oral procedures or for another preliminary  ruling. The presumption 
of equivalent protection was maintained, and the Court decided against  the plaintiffs28. Once again, 
there was a deferral to the EU and its fundamental rights approach.
12
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 2. Accession of the EU to the ECHR 
 2.1 Problems and complexities
 
 Laurent Scheek called the moves made by the ECtHR in cases such as Bosphorus as 
diplomatic intrusions on the legal order of the EU, with effects in the way the CJEU regards the 
application of the Convention in its sphere. “The ‘diplomatic intrusion’ of the ECtHR into European 
affairs and its diplomatic political and juridical dialogue, has not only transformed the way in which 
the CJEU sets its priorities, defines its autonomy, and interprets EU law, but it has also deeply 
influenced EU law and treaty-making”29. Although the author forgets to mention that the CJEU had 
already made a slight intrusion itself on the ECHR, by inserting the Convention in the EU legal 
sphere (an almost informal type of accession), it  correctly points out  the implications that the 
Convention has had in the EU and its development.
 However, this picture seems incomplete. The ECHR is part of EU law, integrated through 
the ECJ’s case law and confirmed by the recent constitutional treaties. But  the ECtHR has no way 
of formally controlling the interpretation of the Convention made by the ECJ. For that to happen, 
the EU would have to become a contracting party and accede to the Convention. In fact, talks 
concerning this option were discussed as long as 30 years ago, being the subject of a Commission 
report in 197930, although only the EU only created a committee to deal with the matter in 199231. 
The CJEU stated in Opinion 2/94 that the treaties, as they were at the time, did not grant 
competence to the Union to become part of the Convention 32 . Member States should then do an 
amendment in order to be able to continue with an accession project. The political process followed 
this suggestion with the approval of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, whose second paragraph of article 
6 TEU states that the Union shall accede to the Convention. This step is an ambitious one, since it 
lays down a compromise by the EU which is constitutionalized in the treaties. This is the opinion of 
13
29 Laurent Scheek, "Diplomatic Intrusions, Dialogues, and Fragile Equilibria: The European Court as a Constitutional 
Actor of the European Union" The European Court of Human Rights Between Law and Politics, Edited by Jonas 
Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen; Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 165
30  Tobias Lock, "EU Accession to ECHR: Implications for Judicial Review in Strasbourg" European Law Review 35 
Issue 6, 2010, pp. 777; Jean Paul Jacqué, id, pp. 1001
31 Jean Paul Jacqué, id, pp. 1002.
32  Opinion 2/94 of the European Court of Justice, “Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, 28 March 1996, http://www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/
repository/Opinion_2_1994.pdf
Jean Paul Jacqué, that “[a] failure to do so could be ground for an action for failure to act before the 
Court of Justice”33.
 The implications of this event are too big for both parties, risking to change the institutional, 
political and legal landscape of Europe. One has to remember that this is a novelty  for both systems 
of law. On one side, the ECHR never had a member like the EU, a sort-of a federal state with a 
strong institutional structure. As Christina Eckes states, “[t]he EU is a compound legal order 
consisting of numerous international actors and the largest share of EU law is implemented or 
applied by national authorities. This means that it requires national support and involvement in 
order to become effective”34. On the other side, the EU never has been subject to an external control 
by another system of law. It is true that the EU is part to certain international treaties (like the 
GATT, for example) and that has to comply with judicial structures established by  these systems. 
However, to be controlled by a human rights court is to be subject to a more extensive system of 
scrutiny  than a trade regime, since all the actions of the EU — be them legal, executive, or judicial 
— of whatever core subject (trade, single market, foreign relations) may affect fundamental rights. 
If the EU accedes to the Convention, it will face scrutiny regarding all its actions. It is not an easy 
process to start, undergo, and end.
 Formal negotiations started in July 2010 and ended in April 5th 2013, with the signing of the 
Draft Accession Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
Rights35. This draft agreement has now been sent to the CJEU for approval. Many of the problems 
that the doctrine has heightened have been answered in this agreement. We will now look at these 
problems and to the solutions proposed by agreement. 
 2.2 The legal problems of accession
a) The respondent mechanism
 The first  problem concerns the respondent mechanism. Most of the legal acts of the Union 
are either applied by  the Member States (regulations or decisions) or developed by them 
(directives). In case an applicant needs to challenge this act, who should be on the stand? The 
14
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34 Christina Eckes, ‘One Step Closer: EU Accession to the ECHR ‘ Const. L. Blog (2nd May 2013) (available at http://
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Member State, since it was the national authority that applied the act, or the EU, since it was the 
one that formulated the act? Or both, even? 
 Tobias Lock defended the idea that there should be a clear understanding of which needs are 
being protected in this situation. In this situation, it  is for the best interests of the applicant  that the 
issue with the respondent must be answered. Following this lead, and basing himself on the notion 
created by the ECJ of the EU as an autonomous entity from its Member States, Tobias Lock 
proposed three solutions. First, in case the act is an EU measure, like a regulation or a decision, it 
should be the EU the respondent. Second, in case it is a national measure, then it is the national 
State the respondent. Third and last, if it is a measure with dual nature, like a directive, then the 
respondent should be the Member State, with the possibility of calling the EU through a co-
respondent mechanism36. 
 This was the approach followed by the Draft  Agreement. In this document, it is stated that 
when a Member State is challenged in Strasbourg, “the European Union may become a co-
respondent to the proceedings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it  appears 
that such allegation calls into question the compatibility  with the Convention rights at  issue of a 
provision of European Union law, including decisions taken under the TEU and under the TFEU, 
notably where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under 
European Union law”37. By this mechanism, the EU will become a part to the proceedings and may 
be held responsible for violations of the Convention. However, the ECtHR has the power of 
limiting responsibility to just one of the respondents, if it finds enough reasons to do so38. 
b) The preliminary ruling mechanism and prior involvement procedure
 The second issue concerns the situation of how to deal with EU judicial remedies. As it is 
known, the EU judicial system works with the cooperation between national courts and their 
European counterparts through the mechanism of preliminary ruling. This mechanism consists on a 
question posed by the national court, concerning the interpretation of EU law, to the European 
Courts. The process has been developed by the ECJ in the Fotofrost and CILFIT cases, and it is not 
mandatory, unless there is a clear connection between the case and EU law and there are no more 
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appeals to be used by the applicants39. The system of applying for the ECtHR is different, since it 
can only happen after all national remedies are exhausted. The question becomes, then, what would 
happen in case an EU question had not been put for preliminary  ruling before the case reaches 
Strasbourg. Would the ECtHR be obliged to send a preliminary question to Luxembourg on the 
interpretation or validity of EU law, before deciding the case? 
 The ECJ could change its jurisprudence on preliminary ruling by making it mandatory for 
every  Supreme Court  to send a question to Luxembourg. As Jean Paul Jacqué states, with regards to 
a possible change to the acte-claire doctrine of Cilfit, “[n]othing prevents a return to a more 
rigorous application of the Treaty in such cases” where a possible conflict between an act of the EU 
and the ECHR is invoked40. The other option would be for the ECtHR to refer a question to ECJ 
before deciding a case where an EU act is at  stake. Judge Timmermans of the ECJ has defended this 
solution, which is present in accession talks41. 
 The Draft Agreement seems very deferential to the EU in this regard. According to article 3, 
paragraph 6, the CJEU may deliver an opinion on the compatibility  of the challenged EU action and 
the ECHR if the EU is a (co)respondent to the proceedings42. This mechanism is known as the prior 
involvement procedure, by  which the EU will be able to address the issue at stake before the 
ECtHR rules on the matter. This gives the EU a privileged position with regards to the other 
contracting parties. Giorgio Gaja states that “[i]t may be expected that the European Court of 
Human Rights will not lightly contradict an assessment specifically made by the Court of Justice”43. 
Christina Eckes, on her side, argues that this should happen since the system of Strasbourg has to 
understand the peculiarities of the EU’s own judicial structure. “The special position accorded to the 
Court of Justice should be seen both as accommodating the Court’s concern with its judicial 
autonomy and acknowledging the particularities of the EU legal order and the judicial power in the 
EU”44.
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c) Review of EU primary law
 The third issue, which is also raised with regard to remedies, is the possibility for the ECtHR 
to review EU primary law. Jean Paul Jacqué stresses the fact that  since the “Union is not the author 
of its primary law, and the EU court  cannot exercise any  review of legality”, then the ECtHR should 
not have be able to control it also45. He argues that if the Strasbourg court did so it  would be acting 
inconsistently  with its own previous case-law on the matter. Oly  Stian Johansen, on the contrary, 
stresses that the ECtHR has control over the contracting State’s constitutions, and that due to the 
equal-footing of the EU as a party to the Convention, it should also be subject to the same control46. 
 In our view, this is a false question. Review of constitutional norms is not even a prerogative 
that national courts have in their own legal orders. As Tobias Lock states, “Convention States’ 
constitutional courts do not have jurisdiction to review the validity of provisions contained in their 
constitution, which they are called upon to interpret”47. There is then no reason for the ECtHR to 
have a different  approach regarding the EU’s case. This seems to be the case, since the Draft 
Agreement does not state anything in this regard.
d) The second pillar
 The final problem to be discussed is the matter of the second pillar of the EU, concerning 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Accession will, in principle, cover all of the EU’s 
activities. However, there are some competences in the EU that cannot be controlled by its own 
CJEU, such as the CFSP. Article 275 TFEU only allows the Luxembourg Court to control, under 
this policy, restrictive measures against individuals. However, it If accession happens as expected, it 
could “result in an asymmetry between the control exercised by the Court of Justice and that of the 
ECtHR”48.
 The ideal answer would be for the EU to make a reservation under article 57 of the 
Convention, as long as it is only of a particular provision and not of “general character”. Another 
option would be for the Convention to be amended in order not to be touch this issue. The Draft 
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Agreement does not state anything in this regard, which makes both options still fairly plausible, in 
the current stage of proceedings.
 2.3 The end of Bosphorus 
 Another important question, which is not directly  answered in the Draft Agreement, must be 
made. The question concerns the fate of the Bosphorus paradigm after the accession. Will it still 
apply or not? 
 As seen before, the argument laid down in the Bosphorus case regards the level of human 
rights‘ protection offered by  the EU in comparison with the Convention itself. According to the 
wording of the case, the EU offers a level of protection which is considered equivalent to that of the 
Convention. Judges arrived to this conclusion after an extensive analysis of the history of European 
Integration and its progressive path, undergone by both the judicial and political process, towards a 
more developed protection of fundamental rights. As Tobias Lock states, “[t]he rationale given by 
the ECtHR for granting the Union’s legal order this privilege is a substantive one: it is an 
acknowledgment that the protection of human rights in the European Union and by the ECJ is of 
such high quality  that the ECtHR can afford to only exercise its jurisdiction where, exceptionally, 
the protection was manifestly deficient”49. 
 However, the main problem in Bosphorus, in the perspective of the ECtHR, is the 
application of an international regulation, external to the ECHR, by  a signatory  State that infringes a 
Convention right. With accession, this act is no longer an external act to the ECHR, since it is a 
legal act by one of its contracting parties. The criterium of equivalent protection rests on this point: 
that the transfer of powers of a contacting party is made to an external party. Once the EU becomes 
part of the Convention, the ECtHR will loose the ratione materiae for applying this paradigm. The 
whole situation could be solved by applying the normal procedure. As Christina Ecke states, “[a]fter 
receiving the Court of Justice’s opinion, the Strasbourg Court will have to scrutinize and rule 
whether the Convention has been breached. It can only  find the specific opinion either correct 
(offering equivalent protection; no violation) or incorrect (misinterpreting the Convention; 
violation). It cannot hide behind general considerations of the human rights protection in the EU 
legal order. The times of Bosphorus are over”.50
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 The other is more institutional political than legal per se, since it concerns the way two 
important judicial bodies will operate in the same space. The institutional framework between both 
European Courts will change after accession, since one of them — the ECtHR — will have the final 
answer in the interpretation of the Convention and its impact in EU law. Until now, we have been 
watching a type of judicial version of “game of thrones”, where both courts have made their moves 
in stating their power towards one another but cautiously controlling a conflict  at  the same time. 
The underlying political message for the EU in Bosphorus is clear: “we can control; but we will not 
do it”. 
 But now one of the Courts will be on top of the other. This will have important implications 
for the ECJ, specially. The ECJ has been used to have the final word in all matters concerning the 
interpretation of EU law. Now, its own interpretation will have to be subject to the control of 
Strasbourg, and without any kind of charity like Bosphorus. It  is true that this control does not mean 
that a EU measure will be invalidated in case of violation of the Convention. The judgments of the 
ECtHR have only declarative effect. But even if this last court cannot invalidate a EU measure, the 
political burden of having its methods and decision-making processes analyzed and judged by 
another entity is not be something judges in the ECJ — and the EU itself — are used too. A decision 
regarding the EU’s failure to protect fundamental rights under the Convention could have important 
effects on the public perception of the Union. This control could compel judges to be more strict on 
their fundamental rights approach and therefore change some of the EU’s polemic decisions. This 
seems to be the meaning of Dean Spielmann’s argument, when defending that “the question of who 
is invested with the final word on a particular issue will then soon become obsolete” after 
accession51.
19
51 Dean Spielmann, id, pp. 780. 
 3. Access to justice in the ECHR
 3.1 From “right to a fair trial” to access to justice in the Golder case
 The ECHR does not establish anywhere in its text and explicit right of access to court, like 
for example the Charter of Fundamental Rights does, in its article 47 on the right for “an effective 
remedy”. There are, however, two articles in the Convention which deal with an individual’s 
procedural rights. The first  is article 6, which states the right to a fair trial. According to the first 
prong of this article: 
 “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded 
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, 
where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent 
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice.”
 The second is article 13, which states the right of a citizen of a contracting state to defend its 
claim to the ECHR (a right of access to the ECHR itself):
 “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that  the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity.”
 As we can see, none of these provisions establishes a right of an individual to, in abstract, 
access a court in order to defend his / her claim. However, this is a right that is nowadays 
undeniably protected by  the Convention. The Court, through an interpretation of the ECHR, 
acknowledged its existence by deriving it  from the preamble and being inherent to article 6(1). The 
paradigmatic case in this regard was Golder, decided in 197552. The case concerned the situation of 
Sidney Golder, a UK citizen that at the time of the proceedings was serving prison time for a 
robbery. He had been accused of participating with a group  of inmates on an attack against one 
prison guard, but charges were dropped after further investigations. He then decided to ask the UK’s 
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Home Secretary  permission to consult a solicitor in order to press charges of libel against those who 
had accused him of being part of the disturbance. However, the Home Secretary, following a law 
that granted him discretionary powers when deciding on this type of permission, did not satisfy Mr. 
Golder’s request, provoking his subsequent complaint to the ECtHR. According to Mr. Golder, the 
refusal by the Home Secretary  to grant him permission to see a solicitor gravely affected is right of 
access to justice.
 The ECtHR started by saying that although access to justice is not mentioned in the 
Convention, it  is an inherent part of it, and established in article 6(1). The Court’s argumentation 
derives from a teleological interpretation of the preamble of the ECHR, where it  is stated that all 
contracting parts share “a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of 
law”53. It is from this last value that the Court takes the idea of access to justice. This right “is a key 
feature of the concept of the ‘rule of law‘, which, as the preamble to the Convention stated, was a 
part of the ‘common heritage‘ of Council of Europe states”54. Also, according to the decision, it 
should be implicit  by a matter of reason in a provision conferring minimum requirements for 
judicial actions to take place (fair hearing, legal assistance, etc) the right to put those same actions 
into place. As the ECtHR clearly states: “It would be inconceivable (...) that Article (...) 6-1 should 
describe in detail the procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit and should not 
first protect that which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit  from such guarantees, that is, 
access to a court. The fair, public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings are of no 
value at all if there are no judicial proceedings.”55 
 The Court continued this interpretation in further decisions such as Hornby, Immobiliaire 
Saffi and Antonakopoulos, thus developing the concept of the right and its place in the ECHR56.
 3.2 The right of access and the margin of appreciation
 The right of access to justice, as other rights in the Convention, is not absolute, and needs to 
be balanced with other realities, since it  can be subject to counter-claims regarding its 
21
53 Case of Golder, id, paragraph 34
54 David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Ed Bates and Carla Buckley, id, pp. 235
55 Case of Golder, id, paragraph 35
56 Peter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn and Leo Zwaak, id, pp. 558
adjudication57. The ECtHR acknowledge this in Golder, also. Basing itself on a previous decision 
concerning the right of education, Belgian Linguistic, the Court stated that right of access to court 
calls “for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and place according to the 
needs and resources of the community and the individuals”58. The Court added that if this is true of 
a right which is clearly expressed in the Convention, it should be even more true of a right which is 
inherent to it, like right of access59. States have therefore some margin of appreciation when 
applying the right. 
 The Golder decision ends without any  consideration of what is or is not a limit to access to 
court. It was a notion for the Court to develop in subsequent decisions. In Ashingdane the Court 
states that there should be a margin of appreciation for States when setting these limits, as long as 
there is a minimum standard of protection60. The Court has developed these margin, and a current 
example can be seen in the Freimann decision of 2004. The Court stated in this decision that:
 “However, this right is not  absolute, but may be subject  to limitations. These are permitted by 
implication since the right  of access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State. In this respect, the 
Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, although the final decision as to the observance of 
the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court. It must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not 
restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of 
the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not  be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it  does not pursue 
a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be achieved”61.
 There are then three criteria created by the Court in order to assess if a State went beyond its 
margin of appreciation. The first is to assess if certain restrictions on the right  affect its “very 
essence”; the second is to assess if these restrictions pursue a legitimate aim; and the third is a 
proportionality test between the goals at stake and the methods used to achieve it 62. These three 
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notions have been treated as being “closely associated or included in the proportionality 
assessment”63.
 Yutaka Arai argues that the Court has failed in an early stage to provide a coherent  definition 
of “very essence” and delivered a very relaxed understanding of the margin of appreciation. 
“Firstly, there was absence of any fully-fledged review of the merits and the failure of the part on 
the part of the Court, in balancing, to have due regard to the effects of the limitations on the victim’s 
right. Secondly, the Court (...) reduced the ‘very essence’ and proportionality  requirements to 
rhetorical values”64. However, the Court shifted its position and acted more stringently with regards 
to the margin of appreciation allowed. Some decisions of the ECtHR like Canea Catholic Church, 
Klass, Todorescu and De Geouffre de la Pradelle lay down certain limits considered to be part of 
that minimum acceptable standard according to Peter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn and 
Leo Zwaak. “These cases indicate that the Court is not inclined to leave a very broad margin of 
appreciation to the national authorities and courts in restricting access to court”65. 
 The more stringent version of very  essence is divided in three parts. The right of access, in 
order not to be minimally impaired, should be in first place foreseeable, in the sense that the litigant 
must have a “clear, practical opportunity” to present his / her claim and that his / her legitimate 
expectations concerning the way the process is run must be “sufficiently safeguarded” 66 . An 
example of this situation is the case of Levages Prestations Services. Here, a company saw its 
claim dismissed by the Court de Cassation for failure to produce an interlocutory judgement in the 
proceedings, and argued that the law requesting this was unclear. The Court, “[i]n order to satisfy 
itself that the very essence of the applicant company’s "right to a tribunal" was not impaired by the 
declaration that the appeal was inadmissible, the Court  will firstly examine whether the procedure 
to be followed for an appeal on points of law, in particular with respect to the production of 
documents, could be regarded as foreseeable from the point of view of a litigant”67. 
 In second place, access to justice has to exist “in law and in fact”, being effective and not 
merely theoretical68. In De Geouffre de la Pradelle the Court declared that  the right is not effective 
if the national law regulating access to courts is so complex and unclear that it creates legal 
23
63 Id, pp. 37
64 Id, pp. 38
65 Peter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn and Leo Zwaak, id, pp. 572
66 Yutaka Arai, id, pp. 39
67 ECtHR, 23 October 1996, Case of Levages Prestations de Services v. France, application no. 21920/93, paragraph 42
68 David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Ed Bates and Carla Buckley, id, pp. 236; Yutaka Arai, id, pp. 40
uncertainty69. This idea was stated also in Kutic: “[a]ccess to justice is also made illusory if the 
applicant has the possibility of bringing legal proceedings, but is prevented by operation of the law 
from pursuing his claim” 70. 
 The third and final requirement is proportionality, or a “‘direct, necessary and adequate link’ 
between the legitimate objective and the restriction on the right of access to a court”71. In this last 
prong, the Court has had to deal with many policy issues, like those concerning national security, 
immunity  of any kind, mental capacity of the litigants and fiscal matters, just to name a few72. In the 
case of Osman, for example, where the applicants were refused to put an action against  the police 
for negligence action, the Court stated that it was “not persuaded (...) by the Government’s plea that 
the applicants had available to them alternative routes for securing compensation”. According to the 
Court, “they were entitled to have the police account for their actions and omissions in adversarial 
proceedings” and so the restriction “in the instant case constituted a disproportionate restriction on 
the applicants’ right of access to a court” 73. This was a limitation on access to justice that was not 
accepted by Strasbourg. But the ECtHR has accepted, for reasons of public policy falling under the 
margin of appreciation, restrictions on access to court based on, for example, parliamentary 
immunity, the provision of good or fair administration of justice, prevention of court overload and 
maintenance of the proper functioning of the judiciary in itself74.
 In sum, the right of access to court  is recognised by the ECtHR, which has been having a 
stricter approach concerning the limitations on the right, specially if these limitations impair the 
central “nucleus” or the “very essence” of access to court. The Court has understood that 
restrictions which affect the foreseeability of the litigant’s claim, frustrating his legitimate 
expectations towards his procedural rights, or measure which do not grant an effective access but a 
mere illusory one, or measures that are disproportional must be considered to affect the notion of 
“very essence”. 
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 4. The problem of locus standi in EU courts
 
 4.1 Notion of the problem: dissecting article 263(4)
 Standing in order to challenge a measure by an European institution is currently  regulated in 
article 263, parts (2), (3) and (4) of the Treaty  of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
(previously article 173 of the Rome treaty and 230 of Maastricht75). The article reads as follows:
 
 “The Court  of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts of 
the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than recommendations and 
opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament  and of the European Council intended to produce legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties. It  shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.
 It  shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement  of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement  of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or 
misuse of powers.
 The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought  by the Court of 
Auditors, by the European Central Bank and by the Committee of the Regions for the purpose of protecting 
their prerogatives.
 Any or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and in the second paragraphs, 
institute proceedings against  an act  addressed to that  person or which is of direct  and individual concern to 
them, and against  a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not  entail implementing 
measures.”
 The provision establishes two things: first, who can bring an action of annulment to the 
European Courts; and second, on what grounds can the applicant bring an action. 
 The second part of the article identifies four applicants: the Member States of the Union, the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. According to the wording of the article, 
these applicants do not need to fulfill any kind of criteria in order to challenge a measure in the 
European Courts. They  have that right just for being these entities. They can thus challenge any 
measure on such open grounds as, for example, “infringement of the Treaties”. For these reasons, 
they  are usually  referred to as “privileged” applicants. Historically, the only problem with this 
prong was the inclusion of the Parliament in the list of privileged applicants. Article 173 did not 
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mention this institution in its original wording, and there were doubts that  the Parliament could 
have the same standing as other institutions such as the Council and the Commission. The Court 
started by  answering this question negatively in the Comitology case, but changed its opinion in 
Chernobyl76. In the Treaty  of Maastricht the Parliament was granted standing to defend its own 
prerogatives, whilst in the Treaty of Lisbon it was finally put at the same level of the other two main 
institutions. The third part  of the article establishes the grounds of standing for other applicants, 
which historically  were institutions that did not exist or had much influence in the early days of the 
Community. These institutions are the Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank and the 
Committee of Regions. Subsequent treaty  amendments granted them standing in order to defend 
their own prerogatives, a situation similar to the one facing the Parliament  after Maastricht.The 
fourth prong of the norm is the problematic part for the purposes of this work. The second part of 
the article, as said before, does not state any criterium for the applicants to fulfill in order to 
challenge a measure. In the third part, the criterium to fulfill is the defense of the institutions’ own 
prerogatives. In the fourth part, on the contrary, we have three sets of criteria that private parties 
must fulfill in order to be able to stand and challenge a legal act. This is why, in comparison with 
the three institutions and Member States, private applicants are usually referred as being “non-
privileged”, since they must fulfill the conditions laid down in the article in order to challenge a 
measure77. 
 There are three dimensions to the limited standing question, presented in the article. First, it 
is important to know which measures are capable of being challenged — or, in other words, what 
does the notion of “regulatory  acts” cover. Second, it is necessary to understand what is the 
meaning of an act being considered of “direct concern” to a certain legal person. Finally, one has to 
know what is the meaning of an act being considered of “individual concern” for that same legal 
person. The openness of the wording of the article already  shows us what is at stake. If the Court 
decides to interpret  these provisions in a very restrictive manner, then it  will be harder for private 
applicants to challenge EU legal acts. Otherwise, if the Court decides to interpret these concepts in 
a more relaxing manner, then it will be easier for private applicants to have direct standing. Art. 263
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(4) can thus be compared to the controls of a gate, opening and closing, depending on the will of the 
gate’s keeper — in this case, the judges of the ECJ. 
 The impact of this situation cannot be underestimated. In a time where the Union has 
competence and powers to act in a way that directly affects individuals in a series of important areas 
of economic and non-economic nature, the possibility  for these same individuals to challenge a 
measure that “bite[s] deeply into national law (...) can thus carry considerable effects for private 
sector actors”78. The possibility of controlling the legal and executive acts of the political power is a 
guarantee that has to exist in order to maintain the proper functioning of the liberal democratic 
system. This is the epitome in most European States, like Germany, France, England and Italy 79. As 
Marionlina Eliantonio and Betül Kas state: “[i]n the EU legal system, because of the democratic 
deficit and the limited supervisory role of the European Parliament, it  is of even greater importance 
to create a system of control over the acts of the European institutions”80. If this possibility  of 
challenging legal acts is restrictive, then one might say that it is not  only an individual right  of 
access to justice that is at stake, but also a fundamental element of political control and 
constitutional functioning. 
 Let us now look at the interpretation the CJEU has done with regards the three dimensions 
of article 263(4).
 4.2 The three dimensions of article 263(4)
a) Type of act
 
 The first dimension concerns the type of acts that can be challenged by non-privileged 
applicants. The second paragraph of article 173 of the Treaty of Rome read as follows:
 “Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to that person or against  a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision 
addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.”
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 The wording of the provision made a distinction between decisions and regulations. Only 
the first type of measures could be challenged by private applicants. The second type could only be 
challenged if it substantively corresponded to a decision. Article 173, thus, only allowed for the 
challenge of measures which were de facto decisions, independent of their form. Regulations which 
contained particular commands for specific actors could be challenged. As Anthony Arnull stated, 
“[w]here the contested act took the form of a regulation, the applicant was generally required to 
show that it constituted in substance a decision(...)” in order to be able to challenge it81. Only acts 
that were substantively of a general nature could not be challenged by private applicants. The CJEU 
stated that the purpose of this prong “is to prevent the Community institutions from being able to 
bar proceedings instituted by an individual against a decision of direct and individual concern to 
him by simply choosing the form of a regulation."82 
 The problem with this issue is to try  to define what  counts as a decision, to find a material 
and not only formal distinction between general and individual acts. The Treaty of Rome defined 
what was both a decision and a regulation in article 189. Whereas a regulation is an act  of general 
nature, binding everyone, a decision only binds those to whom it  is addressed. Anthony  Arnull says 
that the problem with knowing if a regulation is in fact a decision has to do not with whom it 
addresses but with whom if affects. “The crucial distinction therefore seems to be between being 
bound by a measure and being affected by it: a true decision binds only a class, while a true 
regulation is potentially binding on everyone, although the class of people it  affects may be more 
limited”83. That was the main question of the applicants in Calpak, for example, since there were 
few peach producers in the EU and they were easily identifiable84.
 The Treaty of Lisbon changed the wording of the norm. Article 263(4) now makes mention 
to “a regulatory act”. The notion of regulatory act, unlike the notions of regulation or decision, is 
not written in the Treaty. There is now the problem of what this definition means. According to 
Mariolina Eliantonio and Betül Kas, the notion of regulatory  act means acts of general nature, but 
not legislative ones. This was the meaning proposed to the drafters by the then presidents of the 
ECJ and the CFI, who “argued that it  would be appropriate to continue to take a restrictive approach 
to actions by individuals against legislative measures and to provide for a more open approach with 
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regard to actions against regulatory measures”85. This new terminology  still shades some doubts, 
since it is open to interpretation, whilst before the terms of decision and regulation had at  least a 
definition on the Treaty. It seems clear that the category now includes acts of other EU bodies and 
agencies that can produce effects to third parties86. But it is difficult to understand what is the 
impact of this change concerning certain regulations which materially  are not of legislative nature. 
The amendment does not change the material distinction of what amounts or not to a legislative act, 
which was the problem concerning the past version of the article. 
 However, the doctrine seems to agrees that this change has facilitated access to justice for 
individuals, since as Alexandra Dubóva states, “individuals are relieved from the obligation of 
proving individual concern when seeking an annulment of the regulatory act”87. Former AG Francis 
Jacobs also believes that this change was the most important one for the judicial system of the EU88. 
b) Direct concern
 The second problem is to understand what the Treaty means by “direct concern”. Of the 
three problems this is the one which has not brought many controversy over time, sine the Court’s 
approach in the case of Les Verts vs. Parliament has stood up until today. In this decision the ECJ 
stated that a measure is of direct concern for someone if it can be immediately applied without the 
need for any  other action by a third party to happen. In the words of the Court, if the measure 
abounds to a “complete set of rules which are sufficient in themselves and which require no 
implementing provisions” then it is of direct concern89. 
 The criteria laid by the Court means to exclude from article 263(4) the possibility of 
challenging measures which only affect the applicant by means of a a discretionary  action given to 
a third party by the law-maker. The Court stressed this in the NTN Toyo Bearing Company v. 
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Council case90. The measure is of direct concern if the third party does not have any type of 
discretion in its application. This means the exclusion of directives from the category legal acts to 
be challenged due to the necessity of being implemented91. This was the idea established in the 
notion of article 263(4) made in the Treaty of Lisbon, by stating that a regulatory act might 
challenged when it “is of direct concern to [the applicant] and does not entail implementing 
measures”.
c) Individual concern
 The notion of individual concern is the most problematic of the three article 263(4) because 
it is the real “key” to the gate. It  is through the interpretation of this criteria that the ECJ has limited 
access of private parties in order to challenge EU acts.
 The Court had to define what was individual concern in 1963, six years after the signing of 
the Treaty  of Rome, in the case of Plaumann & Co. vs. Commission. This case concerned a German 
company that imported fruits from a third country, an activity subject to a custom duty, according to 
the Common Customs Tariff in place in the EEC at the time. The company, Plaumann, decided to 
challenge the act of the European Commission that refused a request of the Federal Republic 
Germany to suspend this tariff, which damaged their business. In essence, there was a decision 
addressed to Germany which a third person wanted to contest, alleging that it  was affected by  it. 
The case fit like a glove under the umbrella of possible situations covered by article 173.
 The Court stated that an applicant can only be individually  concerned in the terms of article 
173 “by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in 
which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes 
them individually just as in the case of the person addressed” 92 . In essence, the applicant has to 
prove that that measure affects him in a way which is similar to the original addressee and different 
from all other external parties to the act. The Court, following this idea, assessed that Plaumann did 
not have individual concern because it lacked these specific attributes. The company  was affected 
by the measure for importing clementines, an activity  which anyone could exercise at any time. In 
the Court’s own words, “the applicant is affected by the disputed decision as an importer of 
clementines, that is to say, by reason of a commercial activity which may at any time be practised 
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by any person and is not therefore such as to distinguish the applicant in relation to the contested 
decision as in the case of the addressee”93. For this reason, Plaumann did not  have standing, 
according to article 173, to challenge the act.
 The problem with the notion is that it is very difficult to envisage a situation which could 
possibly fulfill it. The criteria of the Court is very strict since it implicates that the applicant proves 
that the measure affects him in an isolated way from all the other recipients of the measure itself. 
Only when the applicant managed to prove that  he belonged to a closed class of people whose 
number “was fixed and (...) no new applications could be added”, as it happened in the 
International Fruit Company vs. Commission case where the Court grant standing94. “[W]here the 
class of persons affected by a measure was an open one, it  was much more difficult for a member of 
that class to establish individual concern”95. However, even this argument of a closed class of 
people affected by  the measure did not stand by itself, since the CFI refused several cases where the 
applicants fitted this logic96. Also, this criterion of “specificity” of the applicant’s individual 
position vis-a-vis the general recipients of the measure made it very difficult for any kind of 
applicant to challenge a legal measure like a regulation, although it could happen, as seen in the 
International Fruit Company case97. Taki Tridimas and Sara Poli state that this test is “detached 
from economic reality”, leading to “the refusal of locus standi even in cases where the applicant is 
the only person of a potential open class at the time the contested measure is adopted and there is 
economically no realistic prospect that other undertakings will become part of the same group”98.
 4.3 Extramet and Codorniu: the revolution that was not
 The interpretation of the notion of individual concern for non-privileged applicants was held 
consistently by  the ECJ during a series of cases. The jurisprudence was open and relaxed in a small 
number of situations, but in general continued to be very restrictive. Anthony Arnull stated that 
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some of these cases where the Court  granted standing, like Les Verts or Piraiki-Patraiki, “were 
characterized by a variety  of special features which cast  doubt on their wider application”99. Usually 
these cases referred to specific areas such as state-aid or anti-dumping. A general relaxation did not 
seem possible.  
 However, in the beginning of the nineties, the CJEU decided two cases in a fashion which 
seemed to show a new willingness to relax the standing for private applicants. These decisions 
could pave way for the much awaited overruling of the Plaumann case law and allow for individual 
applicants to have more opportunities to challenge EU measures.
 The first case was Extramet100. Extramet was the largest calcium importer in the EU and 
decided to challenge an anti-dumping regulation which gravely  affected its position in the market. 
The Court stated that Extramet was “the largest importer of the product forming the subject-matter 
of the anti-dumping measure and, at the same time, the end-user of the product” and agreed that the 
company was severely affected by the regulation, in a market where it  had only one competitor101. 
For the Court, this situation satisfied the Plaumann test, and the applicant could stand to challenge 
the regulation. The novelty of Extramet was the fact that  the Court used the same criteria for a 
situation which would usually be dismissed, since — and paraphrasing Plaumann — anyone could 
exercise that activity in the future. The Court decided to follow a more material approach than 
usual, taking into considerations the effects of the restriction in the applicant’s market position. 
Although the measure was general, it  materially  applied only to one concrete actor, the sole 
competitor in the market. However, although this case showed an opening for change, the Court 
also chose carefully  to make this decision in order to limit its effects to happen only in the area of 
anti-dumping, an economic-oriented case, which was closer to the essential constituent elements of 
the treaties102. There was then the doubt of whether this relaxation could be applied to other 
situations103. 
 Two years after Extramet came the Codorniu case104. Codorniu concerned a Spanish 
company which was the largest producer of a sparkling wine of “crémant” type, which it had been 
producing since 1924. The Council issued a regulation stipulation that the designation of “crémant” 
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could only  be used for sparkling wines produced in France and Luxembourg. Codorniu challenged 
the regulation since it  prohibited the company from selling its product as being the type of wine that 
they  had always produced. Like in Extramet, the applicant also succeed in having standing. The 
Court held that the criteria of individual concern was satisfied since the regulation gravely  affected 
the business of Codorniu, since the company had been selling the “crémant” wine for several 
decades. Again, the Court decided to follow a material reasoning: the applicant’s commercial 
interests were gravely affected by the regulation, and that was why he should have standing in order 
to challenge the measure.
 These cases brought big hopes with regards to the solving of the limited standing problem. 
But more than just relaxing the criteria, these cases did not overruled the old Plaumann formula. 
Both decisions were sparse in reasoning: in Codorniu the ECJ just stated that the applicant had 
“established the existence of a situation which from the point of view of the contested provision 
differentiates it from all other traders”105. “The reader of both judgments is left with the impression 
that the Court was unable to agree to anything more than the briefest of reasons to support its 
conclusions.”106  This option by the Court, as Anthony Arnull states, might have been meant to 
“conceal” the importance of its judgment107. By not overruling Plaumann, the Court was taking 
pragmatic steps in relaxing the criteria. It did not present a new solution for cautious reasons — 
after all, the Plaumann criteria had been in use since 1963; to simply  overrule it would have meant 
a big step  for the CJEU. But even with this reasoning, it seemed that the CJEU was more open to 
relax the criteria, even if it did so by using it all the same when deciding on the applicant’s right to 
standing. 
 However, this was not what happened. Taki Tridimas and Sara Poli write that two cases in 
the aftermath of Codorniu, Campo Ebro and Buralux were solved by  the traditional Plaumann 
formula108. As Anthony Arnull states, “Recent case law shows that the optimism with which some 
commentators (this one included) greeted the ruling in Codorniu was largely misplaced. It is true 
that private applicants may now in principle challenge true regulations and true directives without 
having to show that the contested act  is in substance a decision. However, the test of individual 
concern seems to have become even stricter, particularly where a legislative act is being 
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challenged”109. In sum, opening showed by these two cases was not sufficient for stating that the 
limited standing problem had been solved.
 4.4 The UPA case and the final word of the CJEU
 In 2001 a new case on appeal from the CFI, Union di Pequeños Agricultores vs. Council (the 
UPA case) arrived at the CJEU. The case concerned a Spanish trade association who lodged an 
annulment action against a regulation that organized the olive oil market in the Union. This 
regulation, according to them, gravely affected their commercial interests. The CFI had already 
ruled on the inadmissibility of the action, considering that although it is possible to challenge 
regulations, the applicant did not have individual concern in this matter. It also stated that the fact of 
UPA’s interests being severely affected by the regulation could not count as being a sufficient 
reason to grant standing110. The ECJ was then called to decide on the possibility  of UPA being or 
not able to challenge the measure.
 AG Francis Jacobs delivered an important opinion in the first stages of the case. In his 
declaration during the proceedings, AG Jacobs stated that what was at question in the case was to 
understand if the EU judicial system, with the interaction between national and European courts, 
provided an effective system of judicial protection for individuals. He stated that the CJEU believed 
it to be so, basing himself in the Court’s opinion in the Greenpeace case. “Suffice it to note that the 
Court's judgment is based on the view that Community  measures of general application should in 
principle be challenged by individuals through proceedings before national courts, and that 
individual applicants are granted effective judicial protection against unlawful measures because the 
national courts may  request a preliminary ruling on the validity of Community measures from the 
Court of Justice”111. But AG Francis Jacobs did not agree with the Court’s opinion. He argued that 
the mechanism of preliminary  ruling did not allow for a complete system of justice and fair access, 
due to the fact that the question is dependent on the national court, which can decide not to put it or 
to err when referring the question. As he said:
 “[T]he principle of effective judicial protection requires that  applicants have access to a court which 
is competent  to grant  remedies capable of protecting them against  the effects of unlawful measures. Access 
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to the Court  of Justice via Article 234 EC [preliminary ruling] is however not a remedy available to 
individual applicants as a matter of right. National courts may refuse to refer questions, and although courts 
of last  instance are obliged to refer under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC, appeals within the national 
judicial systems are liable to entail long delays which may themselves be incompatible with the principle of 
effective judicial protection and with the need for legal certainty”112. 
 Also, not all community measures require acts of implementation by national authorities. 
For AG Francis Jacobs, the important thing to do is to change the notion of individual concern. The 
new notion should be more pro-applicant, thus considering the material consequences of the EU act 
on the individual’s interest. “[It] should therefore be accepted that a person is to be regarded as 
individually concerned by a Community measure where, by reason of his particular circumstances, 
the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests”113. 
 The CFI received the Jego-Quéré case while the CJEU was still deciding on UPA, and took 
the opportunity  to make an important decision in the quarrel of locus standi rules. Jego-Quéré was a 
French fishing company  that wished to challenge a Council regulation concerning fishing methods. 
The regulation prohibited the use of a certain type of nets which were used by the applicant. The 
CFI started by  stating that “access to the courts is one of the essential elements of a community 
based on the rule of law” and that it is defended by the case-law of the ECJ and article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights114. Then, the Court tried to see if there were any available judicial 
options for the applicant to challenge the measure, taking direct issue with the ECJ’s position of a 
complete system of remedies. The Court did not think this was the case in the present situation, 
citing AG Francis Jacobs’ opinion in UPA. “The fact that an individual affected by a Community 
measure may be able to bring its validity  before the national courts by violating the rules it  lays 
down and then asserting their illegality  in subsequent judicial proceedings brought against him does 
not constitute an adequate means of judicial protection.”115. The Court thus reached the conclusion 
that standing must be granted to the applicant, because otherwise it would not be possible for him to 
challenge a measure which affected his situation. This would have amounted to a denial of his right 
to access justice. The CFI decided to follow the opinion of AG Francis Jacobs in UPA, and 
defended a looser understanding of locus standi provisions in this particular case, thus taking issues 
with the previous approach of the CJEU in the matter.
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 The CFI was not proposing a new long-term solution for the problem, but rather to avoid 
that the applicant in this specific case had his right  of access to court violated. Taki Tridimas and 
Sara Poli state that “The CFI test is clearly  less ambitious: understandably, the Court was 
preoccupied with the facts of the case and less concerned about articulating a general theory of 
locus standi”116. Both the decision and the opinion of AG Jacobs seemed to follow the new 
approach of the CJEU in Codorniu and put some pressure on the higher Court to clearly  withdraw 
its historical position on the issue.
 However, the CJEU declined to follow the approach suggested by AG Francis Jacobs and by 
the CFI in Jego-Quéré. The decision is divided in three parts. In the first one, the Court decided to 
uphold the CFI’s decision on the inadmissibility of standing for the applicant, since UPA does not 
fulfill the criteria of individual concern117. In the second one, the Court responded to AG Jacobs 
(and indirectly, to the CFI’s decision in Jego-Quéré), considering that  the judicial structure of the 
EU provides for “a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial 
review of the legality of acts of the institutions”118. In the third and final part, the Court admitted 
that a different system of judicial review is possible in the Union. But that system can only be 
created by a Treaty amendment, thus putting the deciding key on the Member States, the guardians 
of the treaties119. The Court then “washed its hands” from solving the problem and put the onus of 
changing the system on the Member States, as Angela Ward points out. “It would seem, therefore, 
that amendment to Article 230 of the EC Treaty  will be necessary  if private parties are to be entitled 
to bind Community  institutions, through judicial channels, to their duty (...) when elaborating 
Community policies.” Although “[t]his contrasts markedly with the policy pursued by  the Court of 
Justice in the context of its case law concerning Member States remedies and procedural rules, with 
respect to which the Court of Justice was equally  bereft of a mandate in the foundation treaties to 
elaborate detailed principles”120, the last statement of the ECJ in UPA is clear. Only by  a change 
through the political process could limited standing be solved.  
 The problem with this idea is the difficulty in making amendments to the treaties, since it 
requires a unanimous agreement between all Member States. There were movements on this 
direction taken by  the Union in the period that preceded the signing of the Treaty of Nice, with the 
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publishing of two reports concerning the judicial system, and addressing the main issues of the fin 
de siécle ECJ: the amounting delay in procedures, the way of dealing with an ever growing case-
load and the composition of the Court, specially with the enlargement of 2004 in the horizon121. 
 Despite these publications and some minor changes to the rules of procedure of the ECJ and 
the CFI, and the already mentioned amendment to article 26, both the treaties of Nice and Lisbon 
failed to bring substantive developments to limited standing rules. Not even the approval of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights managed to influence the Court to change its understanding of 
individual concern and move to a more material approach. The overture showed in Extramet and 
Codorniu did not develop.
 4.5 Critiques to the limited standing problem
 Many authors have taken issues with the restrictive interpretation of the notion of individual 
concern taken by the CJEU since Plaumann.
 For Eric Stein and Gregg Vinning this had to do with the difficulty of the Court  of Justice, 
working as a transnational court and “opening ground” in a revolutionary and controversial way, to 
locate itself in the European judicial and political realm. Although it risked several important 
decisions with the granting of direct effect and supremacy to European law, it still had to decide 
whether to be a “transnational” or a “federal” entity. This “existential” problem made it  be more 
federal in one way  (direct effect and supremacy) and more transnational in another, by limiting the 
access of private people to the Court. It  was a way not to compromise the progressive and historical 
achievements that it was doing by giving power to applicants vis-a-vis the Member States122. 
 Hjalte Rasmussen, on his part, argues that limiting locus standi rules is part of the Court’s 
ideal of becoming a higher court of appeals of European law. The way of getting this is by allowing 
private applicants to challenge EU measures in national courts through the preliminary ruling 
mechanism, thus making these same courts refer to the ECJ which then acts as a supreme court and 
establishes the rules that other lower courts will have to follow123. 
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 Albertina Albors-Llorens, on her side, believes that the Court in Plaumann was just 
following the will of the Member States. She makes an historic overview of European Integration 
and states that, in the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, standing requirements were very 
liberal. Article 33 was interpreted by the High Authority in the Nold case in order to encompass 
every  measure that “directly affects the position of the applicant”. The framers of the Treaty  of 
Rome did not state the same in article 173, by creating the requirements of direct and individual 
concern. Albors-Llorens thus argues that the Court did not want to go against the framer’s 
intention124. 
 Anthony Arnull, on its turn, dismisses this argument. He looks at how the Court did not 
follow the letter of the Treaty  in the early stages of EU integration as a sign of its will to go against 
the framer’s intention when deemed necessary. He cites the ERTA case, which allowed parties to 
challenge an act in the beginning of procedures, where the Court stated that “to interpret the 
conditions under which the action is admissible (...) restrictively” is not compatible with the 
purpose of the rule of law125, and the Chernobyl case, which gave powers of standing to the 
Parliament, as evidence of this. The reason for having art. 173 has to be different. He then presents 
reasons which are very similar to those of Stein and Vinning: that the Court was still trying to 
establish itself in the Community. More than that, the Court was trying, through its actions, to 
establish the Community itself in European legal and political sphere.
 This is also the idea of Taki Tridimas and Sara Poli. Both authors state that the “[CJEU] and 
the CFI are already overburdened by a heavy case-load” and that relaxing the criteria would bring a 
proliferation of cases which in the end might be unbearable to handle. They  present other 
arguments, such as the fact that restrictions of access to court are normal in most European states, as 
the limiting possibilities for individuals to challenge legal acts 126. In another article, now co-written 
with Gabriel Gari, Taki Tridimas states that it  is an institutional concern to maintain a sustain case-
load, and that the Court is more eager to have a strict approach regarding Member States actions 
than with EU legal acts. "Where it comes to judicial review of Community  action, the influence of 
pro-integration policies in the Court's decision making is manifested not by  way  of judicial activism 
but by way of self-restraint. It is the passive approach to the review of the legality  of measures 
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adopted by Community institutions and the conservative criteria on standing which functions as 
instruments of federalism"127.  
 In our view, we agree with Eric Stein and Gregg Vinning and Takis Tridimas and Gabriel 
Gari’s opinion that the CJEU operated (and operates yet) a different control vis-à-vis acts of the 
European institutions than it does regarding acts of the Member States. The Court was trying in the 
first years to empower the EU in front of the Member States by giving direct effect to EU law. To 
extend the notion of standing would have meant a step too far for the Court at that stage, since it 
could risk suffering a backlash form private parties regarding the own action of the EU. Nowadays, 
albeit the pressure from plaintiffs and academics, but due to the current case-overload, it is difficult 
for the CJEU to change its approach.
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5. Limited standing problem and the ECHR
5.1 The two paradigms: “very essence” and Bosphorus
 We have seen, on one hand, how the right of access to justice is understood by the ECtHR. 
The Strasbourg Court declares that it is an important right protected by  the Convention, but that 
States have a margin of appreciation concerning its adjudication, as long as that margin respects the 
“very  essence” of the right. We have also seen, in another hand, how the ECJ has answered critiques 
to its position towards standing of private parties in order to challenge EU measures. The 
Luxembourg Court considers that the current status quo, which allows for individuals to challenge 
EU measures in front of national courts, provides an effective judicial protection. We now face the 
final task of our work, which is to see how, in case of accession, would the limited standing 
problem in the EU judicial system be judged under the ECHR system.
 As said before, the ECtHR gives some margin of appreciation to States when limiting access 
to justice, as long as the minimum level of protection required is maintained. A defense of the ECJ’s 
strict interpretation of standing rules in article 263(4) would inevitably  need to prove that the “very 
essence” of the right of access to court, in its three notions, is respected. An analysis of these 
requirements by looking at the judicial criteria laid by the case-law of Strasbourg from Golder until 
recently, and a comparison with the ECJ’s defense of its system in UPA is therefore necessary. 
 However, another important element must be pondered. The ECtHR had the opportunity to 
express its opinion on the EU’s judicial system in a series of decisions since (and including) 
Bosphorus. The Court issues here clear considerations regarding the way individual’s access to 
judicial protection is respected in the EU. These considerations must be taken into account when 
assessing a possible judgment of locus standi rules since they reveal a prior opinion of the ECtHR 
which may be deferential of the ECJ’s position. 
 We will focus on these two points in this section. First, we will consider the margin of 
appreciation granted to contracting states with regards the adjudication of the right of access to 
justice, and see how the EU’s approach, laid in UPA, might or not fit in this criteria. Second, we will 
look at  the decisions of the ECtHR that  make references to the EU’s judicial system of protection 
and what consequences they might have for the debate at stake.
5.2 Margin of appreciation and the “very essence” requirement 
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 As discussed in part two, the right of access to court is inherently established in article 6(1) 
of the Convention. The ECtHR admits that Contracting States have a margin of appreciation when 
restricting this right, but this margin is subject  to limits. The restriction imposed on the right cannot, 
on one hand, violate its “very  essence” — it cannot frustrate legitimate expectations of the applicant 
and its exercise must be factually  possible and not just illusory  — and, on the other hand, has to 
pursue legitimate aims. Finally, the means applied must be proportional to the achievement of the 
purpose that is pursued. It is through these three tests that the position of the ECJ must be assessed.
 Let us look at first at the test of the “very essence” requirement. We will start with the 
second sub-test of the criteria, that  the exercise of the right  must be possible and not illusory. This 
seems to be the most difficult point for the EU to defend since it is where the strict interpretation of 
the notion of individual concern will be more at stake. Although there is a measure that allows 
individual applicants to challenge a legal act of the EU — article 263(4) — the strict interpretation 
rendered by the ECJ may make this possibility  rather difficult in practice to happen. Only  those who 
can prove that the measure affects them as if they were the receivers of the act, isolating them from 
all other possibly affected people, can de facto have standing. As we have seen before, only  a small 
category of people can possibly fit this notion. This interpretation amounts for a denial of justice for 
those who are concretely affected by the measure in their economic interests, such as Jego Quéré or 
UPA. It is therefore a right which, albeit theoretically possible, it is very difficult to be exercised in 
a concrete situation. The partial relaxation of the article in the Lisbon Treaty, in situations 
concerning decisions, should not change this paradigm very much, since in matter where 
regulations are at stake (such as UPA, for instances) the applicant will still not be granted a right to 
 The other sub-test, of foreseability and protection of legitimate expectations of the applicant, 
is connected to the test of concrete and possible exercise of the right. An applicant must have a 
“clear, practical opportunity” to challenge any  a measure which affects his / her rights. This 
connects with one of the points raised by AG Francis Jacobs’ opinion in UPA, the problem of legal 
certainty128. The application of the notion of individual concern is not always clear. Although the 
ECJ’s interpretation has been more or less consistently upheld, there are still cases where the Court 
applies the criteria differently, such as Codorniu. Individual applicants therefore have problems in 
foresseing the chance for their claim to be accepted in the ECJ. In some cases the Court seems to 
accept the effect suffered by these same individuals in their legal sphere; in other it does not.  
 The second test of article 6(1) concerns the purpose of achieving a legitimate aim with the 
approval or maintenance of the restriction. We enter the discussion of policy  reasons that  might be 
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behind the restriction imposed by the strict interpretation of the ECJ. This is a difficult test to argue. 
The ECJ has never presented the reasons behind its approach. In fact, since Plaumann that the 
Luxemborug Court merely states its interpretation of individual concern, assesses if the applicant 
fits the test  and dismisses or accepts the claim. It  has been the task and work of legal scholars to 
present their thoughts on the possible policy reasons behind this interpretation, as seen in the last 
section of part three. In this regard, there are two reasons which we consider more pertinent and that 
might be used by the EU to explain its policy. 
 The first is the defense of the preliminary ruling system and the principle of sincere 
cooperation laid down in article 5 of the TEU. The preliminary  ruling mechanism has been one of 
the central motors of European integration and a unique characteristic of its system. With this 
system of cooperation, national courts have been called upon to participate in the Integration 
process through the submission of questions to the ECJ. This system allows for the national courts 
to have the possibility of judging the claim at stake, since EU law is part  of national law, and for the 
ECJ to have control over the application of EU law. In UPA the ECJ refers to this issue when stating 
the principle of sincere cooperation and the effective protection granted to individuals through this 
inter-State system129. The maintenance of this status quo can be used as a legitimate aim to protect 
by the ECJ with this interpretation.
 The second reason is the argument of case overload. The preliminary  ruling mechanism 
spares the Court the discussion of several cases that can be decided at a national level, since 
according to the Cilfit doctrine of “acte claire” it is not mandatory for a court to send a question. As 
we have seen before, authors like Anthony Arnull, Takis Tridimas and Sara Poli defend that the ECJ 
is not  relaxing its interpretation of individual concern in order to protect itself from a possible case 
overload. This is an argument with strong factual evidence: the number of cases has been rising 
steeply in the past few years and decisions have been rendered with more and more delay130. It is 
likely that the case-load will tend to continue on this growing tendency, thanks to the enlargement 
process going on in Eastern countries and the growth of political competences of the Union, now in 
the financial area. This is an argument that might receive acceptance in Strasbourg, since the 
ECtHR has accepted it as falling under the margin of appreciation of States when complying with 
article 6 of the Convention. The example is the case Brualla Gómez de La Torre v. Spain, where the 
court considered “legitimate the aim pursued by” the restriction on access to court “so as to avoid 
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that court’s becoming overloaded with cases of lesser importance”131. The ECtHR is also having 
problems with case-load managing, which would make an argument in this regard more sensible. 
However, as we have seen, the ECJ never said that this was the reason behind its continuing 
position regarding strict  standing rules. The Court prefers to say that is applies the criteria due to 
legal reasoning than to say  that the criteria is applied for reasons of political or institutional nature 
— although it  seems that this is the case. In any  case, the fear of case overload might be seen as a 
system of 
 The third and final test concerns a proportionality  assessment between the goal sought and 
the means used to achieve it. This proportionality judgement will focus on seeing if the restrictive 
interpretation in the end affects the right of access in an unfair manner. The critical bulk for this test 
will be the justification of the ECJ when upholding its defense of the Plaumann formula in UPA. 
The ECJ stated that the current  judicial structure of the EU allows for “a complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of acts of the 
institutions”132. The EU might argue that albeit  its judicial system makes it difficult for individual 
applicants to directly challenge EU measures in front of its Courts, they can challenge them through 
the courts of the Member States. By this way, the individual will be protected and be able to present 
a claim upon a violation of EU law. 
 Summarizing our thoughts, it seems that the biggest challenges for the ECJ will be in “the 
very essence” test and on the presentation of its legitimate aims to do so. The EU Court’s 
interpretation of locus standi rules does in fact render a denial of justice to individuals, which 
However, in the subsequent proportionality  test, it seems that  the EU might have a case to defend 
this strictness of approach. And, as we shall see next, it  might have already been given a helping 
hand by the ECtHR itself.
 
5.3 The bed that the ECtHR laid
 In part  one of this work we looked at the relation between the legal orders of the EU and the 
ECHR, and how both Courts have interacted with the other’s system when the circumstances of the 
case at stake asked for it. In the case of the ECtHR, this happened in decisions like Matthews, 
Bosphorus, Emesa Sugar and Kokkelviserij. As we stated before, there are two cases where the 
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ECtHR had the opportunity to express opinions concerning the EU’s judicial system. These 
decisions can be chronologically organized and allow for the presentation of a theory.  
 We have already seen the impact of Bosphorus in defining the relations between the ECHR 
and the EU, through the creation of the criteria of equivalent protection. What we did not speak 
about was that  the ECtHR made several interesting arguments concerning the judicial system of the 
EU and how it protects individuals in the decision. This happened when the Court was evaluating 
the EU’s commitment to human rights protection in order to understand if it offered an equivalent 
level of protection to that of the Convention. Although the Court admits that “access of individuals 
to the ECJ (...) is limited” since there is restrictive standing rules under the Treaty provisions to 
challenge a EU measure133, it  also considers that it “remains the case that actions initiated before the 
ECJ by the Community institutions or a member State constitute important control of compliance 
with Community norms to the indirect  benefit of individuals”134. The Court did not go further in 
developing this argument, since the case at stake concerned other issues that right of access to court. 
But it laid what can be called a first stone, seemingly accepting that  the EU judicial system offered 
a sufficient level of protection to individuals even if it granted only limited standing. 
 There were discussions about article 6 in Emesa Sugar and Kokkelviserij, but they were 
focused on the problem of fair trial — the question of adversarial procedure in an applicant’s claim 
to reply to the AG’s opinion — and not specifically on right of access to court. However, the 
ECtHR either dismissed the claim as inadmissible or considered that the rules of fair trial were not 
violated by the impossibility  of answering to the AG. These two steps can be seen as some leniency 
of the ECtHR towards the EU judicial system. 
 It was in the recent Michaud case that  the ECtHR made a clear declaration regarding the 
protection of individuals by the judicial system. Michaud concerned a French lawyer who wished to 
contest an EU directive on the subject of money laundering. According to the directive, lawyers 
should report  any behavior of their clients that might be considered suspicious of money laundering 
when counseling them in certain activities, such as real-estate negotiations or banking matters. 
Michaud considered that this matter violated the duty of confidentiality  between lawyer and client, 
protected by article 8 of the Convention. In the decision, the ECtHR had to analyse the relationship 
of this case with EU law since there was a directive at stake. Following the same rationale of 
Bosphorus, the Court  looked to see if the presumption of equivalent protection (which was rebutted 
by Michaud in his complaint) was still valid. The ECtHR acknowledged, like it  did in Bosphorus, 
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that the EU “offered equivalent protection of the substantive guarantees” and that it  had to see if the 
“machinery for monitoring” this same protection was equivalent to that of the Convention or not. 
The Court then laid his opinion in paragraph 111:
 "So, although individual access to the Court  of Justice is far more limited than the access private 
individuals have to the Court  under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court  accepts that, all in all, the 
supervisory mechanism provided for in European Union law affords protection comparable to that provided 
by the Convention. Firstly, because private individuals are protected under Community law by the actions 
brought before the Court  of Justice by the Member States and the institutions of the European Union. 
Secondly, because they have the possibility of applying to the domestic courts to determine whether a 
member State has breached Community law, in which case the control exercised by the Court  of Justice takes 
the form of the preliminary referral procedure open to the domestic courts."135
 The Court decided that equivalent protection could not be used, but the statement was 
already done. This reasoning of Strasbourg is the best answer that the EU can present in order to 
justify  in the proportionality test  why it does comply with article 6(1) of the ECHR. It is also 
interesting to note the similarity between the ECtHR’s opinion and the one laid down by the ECJ in 
UPA, when stating the importance of the system of preliminary ruling, although the Strasbourg 
Court presents another interesting argument. The “indirect protection” of individuals offered by the 
Member States and the EU institutions bases itself on the premise of the defense of public good by 
public bodies. It represents a classic view that the State is the best protector of individual’s rights in 
the international sphere, and resonates with Eric Stein and Gregg Vining’s assessment of the role the 
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Conclusion: A never ending story?
 The limited standing problem is as old as European integration itself. One can say  that it is a 
mark, a scar of what Eric Stein and Gregg Vinning defined as the existential-constitutional “angst” 
of the Community, to be a mere transnational body or a full-federal entity. It is interesting to see 
that the interpretation of “individual concern” has stood more or less consistently over all the 
history of the EU. As Anthony Arnull states, it is necessary  to “adapt the action for annulment to the 
way in which the Community  has developed and to address difficulties which the authors of Article 
230 quite understandably failed to foresee. The thread which links them together is the need to 
ensure that the political institutions of the Community respect the limits of their powers and to give 
individuals a remedy when they fail to do so”136. This is yet to happen, with the current changes in 
Lisbon unlikely to bring any significant change in the matter.
 The future accession to the ECHR could be an opportunity for the locus standi problem to 
be finally resolved. The external control of the ECtHR in Strasbourg and the political weight of its 
decisions would pressure the EU and its Court of Justice to change the strict interpretation of 
individual concern. However, as this work has tried to argue, it does not seem the case that the 
ECtHR would rule against the EU in this matter. The understanding of right of access to court in 
article 6 of the Convention and its limitations allow for derogations in accordance with certain 
criteria, such as a proportionality assessment and the purpose of achieving a legitimate aim. The 
over-burdening of the ECJ’s dock could be used in this regard as a good counter-argument for a 
more flexible criteria of access to justice. Furthermore, the ECtHR has been very deferential in its 
approach regarding the EU, as the Draft Accession Agreement has proved. The Court  has also ruled 
in previous decisions such as Bosphorus and Michaud that the judicial system of the EU allows for 
an effective protection of individuals. Accession is a positive event, but it does not seem that it will 
bring any development in the solution of this problem.
 Three are three possible solutions for the question. The first one is the most direct and 
simple: the Court  of Justice overrules the Plaumann interpretation explicitly, following the claim of 
former AG Francis Jacobs’ opinion in UPA. However, as we have seen, the Court does not seem 
eager to change, even with the shift of constitutional paradigm. The second solution would be for 
the ECtHR to overrule its statements with regards the efficiency of the judicial system of the EU. 
something that, with the recent Michaud decision, does not appear likely either. The third solution 
would be to reform, once more, the articles concerning standing of private parties in front of the 
46
136 Anthony Arnull, “Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Since Codorniu”, id, pp. 24
Court of Justice, or something more. It is true that the interpretation of article 173 (now article 263) 
is to strict and amounts to a denial of justice, specially at a time when the Union has much more 
competences than it ever has. But one must remember that not being able to deal with its case load 
will eventually lead tout court to an inefficient delivery of justice, and so to a denial of it, mutatis 
mutandis. In this regard, only a re-structuring of the judicial system of the EU would allow for a 
change in this regard. This seems implausible at the current moment for two reasons. First, it would 
need the agreement of the 28 Member States in order to be effective. The Treaty of Lisbon was 
recently  approved, and presented some changes in this regard that are not enough. There probably  is 
no political will to change the paradigm. Second, the discussions of reform in the EU have been 
swept away by matters of financial and economic governance. The political actors are currently 
more focused in tackling the crisis than in changing the judicial structure of the EU. 
 “In UPA, Advocate General Jacobs declared: ‘To insulate potentially unlawful measures 
from judicial scrutiny  can rarely, if ever, be justified on grounds of administrative or legislative 
efficiency.’ Only when that  view commands widespread acceptance will the Union Courts be able 
to contribute fully to enhancing the Union’s accountability and legitimacy.”137 In the end, we must 
either wait for a political or judicial shift regarding these issues. As implausible as they seem in the 
short-term, they will have to happen sometime, otherwise, this will be one more “brick in the wall” 
of integration and with the EU’s current public image falling, these bricks might be dangerous in the 
long-term.
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